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The parties to the proceeding below are: 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant: D.J. Investment Group, L.L.C. 
Defendant, Counter claimant, and Third Party Plaintiff: SunCrest, L.L.C. 
Third-Party Defendants: David Mast, Judith Mast, and U.S. General, Inc. 
The parties to the appeal are: 
D.J. Investment Group, L.L.C. and SunCrest, L.L. C. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
D.J. Investment offers one argument, albeit in several forms, in opposition to 
SunCrest. D.J. Investment claims that the decisions below should be reviewed for 
abuse of discretion, not for legal correctness. D.J. Investment buttresses this claim 
by a recitation of its view of the facts below (supplemented, improperly with 
statements about matters not in the record before this Court). D.J. Investment's 
argument, however, misses the point. The issue here is whether the courts below 
applied Rule 3.7 properly when they considered only the burdens on Mr. Snuffer's 
client should he be disqualified and failed to consider the burdens on SunCrest 
should he appear as both trial counsel and witness and the burdens imposed on the 
court and jury should Mr. Snuffer appear as both trial counsel and a witness. The 
failure to consider the burdens on SunCrest and on the court is a failure to apply 
Rule 3.7 properly, z.e., a legal error. 
ARGUMENT 
In Opposition to SunCrest's Opening Brief, D.J. Investment offers one legal 
argument - that the lower court decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, not 
correctness of law. This Court granted review on the question of whether the 
Court of Appeals applied the proper standard governing a motion to disqualify trial 
counsel under Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct when it failed to 
1 
consider the prejudice to SunCrest and the burden on the judicial system in its 
analysis of SunCrest's Motion to Disqualify Mr. Snuffer. D.J. Investment claims 
that this is an issue of fact, subject to deferential review for abuse of discretion. It 
isn't. 
The fundamental issue of SunCrest's appeal is not whether the Court of 
Appeals (or the trial court) properly balanced factor A against factor B, whether 
the Court of Appeals accurately weighed the respective burdens of the parties. 
Were that the issue, the decision would be reviewed for abuse of discretion. But 
that is not the issue; it is, instead, whether the Court of Appeals employed the 
proper standard at all. 
The Court of Appeals weighed the burdens which might fall to D.J. 
Investment should SunCrest's motion under Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7 be 
granted. It did not consider the burdens denial of that motion would impose either 
on SunCrest or on the judicial system, and for that reason failed to apply the proper 
standard governing a motion to disqualify under Rule 3.7. The failure to even 
consider these burdens is an error of law, not an error in weighing facts. 
What the Court of Appeals did, in effect, was to presume that no burden on 
SunCrest (or the judicial system) could counterbalance or outweigh the burdens on 
D.J. Investment. That is not what Rule 3.7 calls for. The standard under Rule 3.7 
requires a court to weigh the burden (or prejudice) which each party may be 
expected to suffer; a court's failure to consider the respective burdens on all parties 
is a failure to apply the proper law, subject to de novo review. 1 State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994) (Utah appellate courts "generally consider de novo a 
trial court's statement of the legal rule"); Weeks v. Ind. School Dist. No. 1-89, 230 
F.3d 1201, 1208 (10th Cir. 2000) ("We review de novo the trial court's 
interpretation of the applicable rules of professional responsibility."). 
Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals even mentions the burdens 
on SunCrest (or the burdens on the judicial system). They could not therefore have 
weighed those burdens, and so failed, as a matter of law, to apply Rule 3.7 
properly. Because neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals considered the 
likely substance of Mr. Snuffer's testimony, they could not have considered the 
consequent prejudice to SunCrest from his appearance as both counsel and a 
witness at trial. Without knowing the likely necessity of his testimony, the burden 
created by Mr. Snuffer appearing both as counsel and a witness cannot be assessed. 
Mr. Snuffer is, after all, the only witness for D.J. Investment capable of supporting 
1 It would be a matter for review under the abuse of discretion standard if 
the issue was whether the court failed to give due weight to one or another factor. 
Where a court ignores factors it is required to consider, it fails to properly follow 
or apply the law. LeaseAmerica Corp. v. Stewart, 876 P.2d 184, 187 (Kan. App. 
1994) ("[A] trial court's interpretation of a disciplinary rule is subject to a de novo 
review."). 
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its interpretation of the Settlement Agreement without contradicting previous 
sworn testimony.2 
Further, the relative burdens are affected by the timing of a motion under 
Rule 3.7. A motion brought in the middle of discovery (as in this case) results in 
different considerations than one brought at the close of discovery (the normal 
timing of a motion under Rule 3.7). The Court of Appeals made no allowance for 
this important factor in weighing burdens. Indeed, the Court of Appeals would 
require a motion to disqualify under Rule 3.7 to be brought even before discovery 
has commenced, when it would, in most cases, be impracticable, if not impossible, 
to weigh relative burdens.3 
The great bulk of D.J. Investment's Opposition is taken up with argument 
concerning matters which are, at best, peripheral to the issues before this Court. 
Disputes over the characterization of the procedural history of the case up to the 
Motion to Disqualify will not illuminate the present issues, nor will arguments 
about subsequent events. Indeed, the latter sorts of disputes are outside the record 
2 Pace D.J. Investment, the trial court has not made any ruling establishing 
that Mr. Christiansen was the person who in fact communicated with Micron 
concerning the easements. 
3 Prior to substantial completion of discovery, parties are very unlikely to 
know whether opposing counsel is likely to be a necessary witness in the matter. 
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on appeal and therefore irrelevant as a matter of law. In any event, there is little 
reason to burden this Court with those disputes. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court considered the burdens 
on and prejudice to SunCrest should Mr. Snuffer appear both as trial counsel and a 
necessary witness. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court considered 
the burdens on and prejudice to the judicial system, including judge and jurors, 
should Mr. Snuffer appear both as trial counsel and a necessary witness. Those 
omissions are errors of law. It is therefore appropriate for this Court to return this 
matter to the District Court, and permit the District Court to correct the error by 
conducting an appropriate fact-finding hearing. 
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2005. 
HOWREY LLP 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
ttorneys for Dp|j5faHaj; 
Counterclaimant/Third-Party 
Plaintiff SunCrest, L.L.C. 
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